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4ABSTRACT
 This paper examines the trends in Central finances over a three-
decadal period beginning from the 1970s. It is found that there is lack of
buoyancy in all the major sources of revenue of the Central Government.
This calls for devising new methods of revenue mobilisation. There are
political economic limits to the premise that direct taxes with its simplified
rate structure and administrative reforms will make good the losses from
the cuts in customs duty revenue. The analysis of the issues involved
would require an examination of the influence of dominant classes on
the state. Very recently however, the thrust of the tax reform seems to be
on introduction of a Central Value Added Tax (VAT).
  Total expenditure of the Central Government as a proportion of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has not increased during the 1990s
when compared to the 1980s. But the composition of expenditure has
shifted more towards revenue expenditure. An emphasis on expenditure
allocation with targetting at a detailed level and innovative tax reforms
aimed at more revenue mobilisation are necessary to achieve qualitative
fiscal correction, But this is often stymied for political economic reasons.
Procrustean  fiscal correction aiming merely at deficit targeting is not a
very desirable method.  The study finds that the main problem in
achieving fiscal consolidation at the Central level is falling revenue and
tax receipts during the 1990s.
Keywords: Deficit targetting, tax buoyancy, revenue receipts.
JEL Classification: E62, E66
5‘‘It is a mouldy fallacy that regardless of
circumstances, the government must
balance its budget every year.
Why not in each month or week or hour?’’
(Jacob Viner cited in Dalton 1954:215)
1. The Fiscal Situation of the Centre - Recent Trends
The study of fiscal situation of the Centre forms the basis for the
analysis of the larger aspects of devolution of funds from the Centre to
the States and the fiscal situation of the States, as they are critically
dependent on the position of the Central finances.
The Union Government embarked upon fiscal correction by
targetting the indicator fiscal deficit (which measured the market
borrowings of the Government) as a proportion of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), in the wake of the balance of payments crisis of 19911
The emerging opinion was that the fiscal policy followed in the 1980s
was profligate and fiscal correction by targeting the indicator fiscal deficit
was called for. The earlier practice of automatic monetisation of budget
deficits by issue of ad hoc 91-day treasury bills was phased out in the
1990s. In effect, the Centre resorted to the costlier route of market
borrowings. The States' did not have the soft option of monetisation of
6budget deficits even earlier. Though the States’ had Ways and Means
Advances and Overdraft facilities from the Reserve Bank of India,
running of an Overdraft above a stipulated period resulted in stoppage
of further facilities from the Reserve Bank of India. With the phasing
out of automatic monetisation of budget deficits, and by entering into
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Reserve Bank of India,
the Centre imposed a harder budget constraint on itself.2
Another feature in the 1990s was that the tax-GDP ratio of the
Centre as well as that of the States started stagnating or even declining.
Though the real expenditure of the Centre and the States has not shown
any significant rise in the 1990s, there has been rise of the revenue
expenditure component of the total expenditure. After a decade of
attempts at fiscal correction3, the important trends in Central finances
can be summarised as 1) declining tax-GDP ratio 2) a rising component
of revenue expenditure in total expenditure 3) interest expenditure
becoming the single largest component of revenue expenditure and 4) a
mild fall in total expenditure as a proportion of GDP in the 1990s as
compared to the 1980s.
2. The Trends in Receipts of the Centre -1970-71 to 2002-03.
The time period selected for the study is 1970-71 to 2002-03. These
three decades witnessed significant upward shifts in economic growth,
changes in expenditure patterns, and tax reforms. This time period was
also one of gradual liberalisation in internal and external sectors4. Our
study aims to analyse the Central finances during this period and examine
the possible impacts of these changes on receipts and expenditure of the
Centre.
In this section, we analyse the trends in receipts of the Central
Government and its components. We start with the examination of the
receipts side.
7a)   Receipts
 The receipts are broadly classified into revenue receipts and capital
receipts. The former can be further classified into tax revenue and non-
tax revenue and the latter into debt creating receipts and non-debt creating
receipts. Let us look at the trends in revenue and capital receipts as a
proportion of GDP.
Figure1(a) Revenue Receipts as Proportion of GDP
Source:  Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
Figure 1(b).  Debt Creating and Non-Debt Creating Capital Receipts
as Proportion of GDP
Source: Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
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8The trend line of the revenue receipts shows an almost stagnant
trend, with a downward movement since 1993-94. As substantial portion
of the revenue receipts is tax receipts (nearly 85 percent) and this
is clearly associated with the declining tax-GDP ratio during the
1990s.
The trends in debt creating capital receipts are increasing when
compared to non-debt creating capital receipts5. Since 1991-92, the
non-debt creating capital receipts includes proceeds of disinvestment
also. The major component of non-debt creating capital receipts is
recovery of loans. The increase in the debt creating capital flows
imposes the committed burden of interest payments in the
expenditure.
Figure 2. Growth Rate of Tax Revenue and its Trend
Source:  Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
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9Figure 3. Trend Growth Rate of Non-Tax Revenue
Source:  Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
The trend of the tax revenue growth of the Central Government
has been showing a downward trend during the 1990s. The major
components of tax revenue are direct and indirect taxes. The former
mainly a consist of Personal Income tax and Corporation tax and the
latter consist of Excise and Customs duties. The trend of the Non-Tax
revenue growth rate of the Centre has been stagnant throughout the period
1970-71 to 2002-03. The Non-Tax revenue consists of user charges for
general, social and economic services and interest and dividend receipts
from the public sector. The trend line indicates stagnation from these
receipts6. Let us look at the components of the tax revenue, which forms
85 percent of the revenue receipts.
Trends in components Tax Revenue
The downward trend in the growth rate of Tax revenue requires
more analysis of its components, namely, the Customs Duty, Central
Excise, Personal Income Tax and Corporation Tax.
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Figure 4.  Trend Growth Rate of Direct Taxes 1970-71 to 2002-03
Source: Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
Figure 4(a). Trend growth rate of Personal Income Tax 1970-71 to
2002-03
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Figure 4(b).  Trend Growth rate of Corporation Tax 1970-71 to
2002-03
Figure 5. Trend Growth rate of Indirect taxes 1970-71 to 2002-03
Source:  Computed from The Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
Figure 5(a). Trend Growth rate of Excise Duty 1970-71 to 2002-03
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Figure 5(b). Trend Growth rate of Customs Duty 1970-71to 2002-03
The trend growth rate of direct taxes shows an upward trend but it
starts plateauing around early 1990s. The trend of Personal Income tax is
upward while that of the Corporation tax shows a downward movement.
The trend of the Excise duties shows an upward trend while that of Customs
duties shows a downward trend. The time period under study was one of
phased tax rate reduction and rationalisation of duties. The probable reasons
for these upward trends in certain taxes could be reduction of rates and
duty rationalisation. But on the whole, the trend of tax revenues show that
it has not been responsive to these changes. There is also a downward
trend in Corporation tax, despite rate reduction. This requires further
analysis and could be due to the fact that a lot of exemptions and deductions
do remain making the tax structure complicate.
To get a clearer idea, let us look at tax-GDP ratios and tax
buoyancies. The tax-GDP ratio has shown a declining trend in the 1990s
(Table 1).  The rise in direct taxes-GDP ratio has not been able to
compensate for the fall in indirect taxes-GDP ratio. India has one of the
lowest tax-GDP ratios among the countries of the world (Report of the
Task force on Implementation of FRBM Act, 2003:15-17 and Figure
2.3).
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Table 1.  Decadal Tax-GDP Ratios
Period Tax/GDP Ratio Direct Tax/ Indirect Tax
GDP Ratio /GDP Ratio
1970s 7.2 1.6 5.6
1980s 8.2 1.5 6.7
1990s 7.5 1.9 5.6
Source: Computed from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
The emerging fact is that the tax revenue growth has not kept pace
with the growth of the tax base, the Gross Domestic Product7.  The reason
for this is that the dominant sector of the GDP, the services sector, which
constitutes more than 50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
has not been brought adequately into the tax net. The Economic Survey
2002 described the emerging section of professionals in the services
sector as a ‘hard to tax group’. To tax this modern sector, more information
gathering and information sharing needs to be done by the revenue
authorities and this requires closer cooperation between Central Excise
(which administers the service tax) and the Income tax departments8.
Instead of the present system selectively taxing a few services, the
CENVAT should integrate the services and manufacturing components
in the manufacturing process (Rao 2001).
Tax Elasticity and Tax Buoyancy
In order to test the elasticity of tax revenue to GDP, we took the
logarithmic transformation of tax revenue and GDP and tested for co-
integration, the null hypothesis of no co-integration failed to reject9 . It
is apparently puzzling as this goes against the theoretical concept, because
for any tax, the base is income or consumption. The consumption again
is a function of income10.  Though income or consumption is the economic
base for taxation, what is defined by law can alter and narrow down this
base. This is the possible explanation for no co-integration between GDP
(the economic base) and tax revenue found here11.
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Table 2.  Results of the Johansen-Juselius (JJ) Test of Co- integration
Maximum Eigen Value test Trace Test
Null Hypo- 95% 95%
thesis Alternative Statistic C.V. Alternative Statistic C.V.
P=0 P=1 8.3 (7.7) 14.1 P≥1 9.1 (8.5) 15.4
P= 1 P=2 0.8 (0.7) 3.8 P≥2 0.8 (0.7) 3.8
Note: Figures in Parentheses indicate the Statistic with small sample
correction.     C.V. = Critical values.
Since the variables are not co-integrated, we empirically test the
association between growth rates (logarithmic first differences) of tax
revenue and GDP, which is in effect testing for the significance of tax
buoyancy. The result indicates that the association between growth rate
of GDP and tax revenue is not statistically significant, which implies
that the overall tax buoyancy is not statistically significant.
Table 3. Association between Tax Revenue Growth and GDP
Growth 1971-72 to 1999-2000
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob
Constant 17.831 3.591 4.965 0.0000
GDP growth -0.221 0.239 0.923 0.364
R2 = 0.031, DW = 1.93
Table 3(b) Residual Properties12
Autoregression 2.643 (0.091)
ARCH 0.165 (0.687)
Normality 0.384 (0.824)
Homoscedasticity-1 1.241 (0.308)
Homoscedasticity-2 1.240 (0.308)
RESET 1.358 (0.254)
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It can be seen that the combined tax buoyancy of direct as well as
indirect taxes is not statistically significant. The revenue side of the
Central finances has not been buoyant despite the GDP growing in a
statistically significant manner during this time period.
The measurement of elasticity of Personal Income tax with the
non-agricultural GDP is also attempted here13.  Both the variables, i.e.
logarithmic transformation of Personal Income tax and non-agricultural
GDP have unit roots, i.e. they are non-stationary at levels. At first
difference, they are stationary14.  When tested for co-integration using
the Johansen and Jesulius (JJ) test, it is found that the null hypothesis of
no-co integration fails to reject.
Table 4.  Results of the Johansen-Juselius (JJ) Test of Co- integration
Maximum Eigen Value test             Trace Test
Null Hypo- Alternative Statistic 95% Alter- Statistic 95%
thesis C.V. native C.V.
P=0 P=1 8.3 (7.7) 14.1 P≥1 9.1 (8.5) 15.4
P= 1 P=2 0.8(0.7) 3.8 P≥2 0.8 (0.7) 3.8
Note:  Figures in Parentheses indicate the Statistic with small sample
correction.    C.V. = Critical values.
Since the variables are not co-integrated at levels, we are regressing
the growth rate (logarithmic first differences) of Personal Income tax on
growth rate of non-agricultural GDP.15
Table  5. Association between Growth of Personal Income Tax and
Non-Agricultural GDP 1971-72 to 1999-2000.
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob
Constant 11.55 6.67 1.73 0.09
Non-Agricultural GDP 0.27 0.41 0.65 0.52
Note:   D-Non-Agricultural GDP = First Difference of Non-Agricultural GDP.
R2 = 0.015   DW= 1.93
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 Table 5(a).  Residual Properties
Autoregression         0.681 (0.515)
ARCH 0.062 (0.804)
Normality 1.646 (0.439)
Homoscedasticity-1 0.020 (0.980)
Homoscedasticity-2 0.020 (0.980)
RESET 1.280 (0.268)
The coefficient of the growth rate of non-agricultural GDP is not
statistically significant, implying that one unit increase in the growth
rate of non-agricultural GDP is not significantly associated with the
growth rate of Personal Income tax. This leads to the inference that the
buoyancy of Personal Income tax in relation to its economic base, non-
agricultural GDP is not statistically significant for the period 1971-72 to
1999-2000. The presumption is that growth of the economy should lead
to more income generation and the buoyancy of Personal Income tax
should have been statistically significant during the period when, the
growth rate of GDP showed two statistically significant upward shifts,
in the 1980s and the 1990s respectively. The reasons for the statistically
insignificant buoyancy of Personal Income tax necessitate further study.16
Possible reasons could be the existence of multiple exemptions and
deductions in the Income Tax Act simultaneously with the cut in tax
rates. The problems of non-compliance, evasion, insufficient collection
of information, insufficient use of collected information and rent-seeking
behaviour among some enforcement authorities are also there. To state
in brief, the legal base17  and administrative implementation are the two
areas requiring analysis for explaining the non-buoyancy of tax revenues
with regard to its economic base.
The report of the Kelkar Task Force on direct taxes also discusses the
problem of non-compliance at middle income groups describing them as
17
the ‘missing middle’.18  The tests of buoyancy of other taxes, i.e. Corporate
tax, Excise and Customs duty also indicate that the association between
their growth rates and growth rate of GDP is not statistically significant.
Political Economic Limits to Tax Reform
As we have mentioned already, there has been significant cuts in
tax rates during the 1990s. The customs duty has been reduced in a
regularly phased manner. The maximum marginal rates of the direct
taxes like Personal Income Tax and Corporation Tax have also been
brought down.  The general perception is that as the economy grows at
a faster pace and the per capita income rises, the proportion of the indirect
taxes in total tax revenue will come down and that of direct taxes will
rise. It is not a matter of dispute that this has happened in India.19 But the
fact remains that the increase in direct taxes has not been enough to
prevent the decline in tax-GDP ratio. In the given political economic
constraints and influence of dominant classes of the society over the
state, both at the policy making level and the cutting edge level,20   it is
quite possible that the limits to enhancing of revenue from direct taxes
may be reached very fast. The limits are caused by power of the interest
groups in retaining the multiple exemptions and deductions, non-payment
by litigating the loopholes in the law, evading by manipulating the cutting
edge level etc. These problems will be quite serious in enforcement of
direct taxes, as it mainly affects classes having resources and power to
fight for retaining benefits. The effect of dominant classes or organised
groups successfully bargaining for concessions in the form of tax breaks
can undermine the theoretical argument that direct taxes with progressive
rates tax the rich more than the poor.
A pertinent point to be noted is that the balance of power of interest
groups is a dynamic process, with new interest groups emerging to be
the dominant ones. In the 1970s, the class of rich farmers grew to be a
18
powerful group (Bardhan 1984). In the 1990s, finance capital emerged
to be a powerful interest group with transnational dimensions. Economic
policies, and budgets are analysed with reference to their impact on the
stock market. The opposition to the securities transaction tax introduced
in the budget 2004 is an example. The successful bargaining of
concessions by interest groups has hamstrung the revenue mobilisation
potential as well as reallocation of expenditure.
Innovative tax reforms are necessary, rather than relying on direct
taxes to bring continuously more revenue as the economy grows, since
it has got political economic constraints. Some suggestions are making
conspicuous expenditure a base for taxation, and deduction of tax at
source at moderate rates on transactions as a final payment etc. Presently,
for Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) in the Income Tax Act, 1961, income
component is not the base, but the aggregate receipts. If the rates can be
moderated and TDS  made as a final payment, it can be a transaction-
based tax covering a wider range of activities.  But these will require a
nation wide information network and effective exchange of information
between various agencies like banks and taxation departments. Whether
the proposed Value Added Tax (VAT) at the Central and State levels will
improve the resource mobilisation efforts or lead to more problems like
increase in cost of detection of tax evasion, problems in distribution of
Centre-State fiscal powers etc. need to be evaluated in the light of the
sector-wise proposals to levy Goods and Services Tax (GST) at the Central
level by the task force on the implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility
and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003. These aspects require
elaborate study and details of tax reforms are beyond the scope of this
paper.21 Suffice it to say that the need for more innovative tax reforms is
to be recognised i.e. tax reforms should strategically tackle the power
and influence of the interest groups by exploiting the contradictions and
divisions among them.22
19
Non-Tax Revenue
The trend of the non-tax receipts is stagnant for the period 1970-
71 to 2002-03. Most of the studies recommend rise in user charges and
thereby raising of more non-tax receipts. The question involved here is
pricing of public goods and pricing of publicly produced private goods.
There are economic, social and political constraints in pricing the utilities
provided by the public sector. There are problems of operational
inefficiencies and cost overruns in public undertakings, which, result in
higher expenditure, and attempts to pass it on to the customer, will meet
with resistance.23  Wicksell (1896) discusses pricing in public utilities
like railway, postal and telegraph administration etc., where an annual
increase or decrease of some millions of passengers, ton-miles of freight,
letters, telegrams etc. has little effect on annual costs and of course still
less on the amount of fixed and working capital and on the interest payable
thereon. If such enterprises were run on a fee principle and total
production costs or at least general operating costs, they will have to
spread over a relatively small number of service units and the unit price
will be normally higher than the marginal cost, i.e. the additional cost
occasioned by an additional unit of service. Such a pricing policy would
allow the public sector to satisfy the demands of only those persons who
rate its subjective value higher or at least as high as the fee is charged.
The entire range of demand, which is less intensive than this objective
level, must remain unsatisfied. Such a scenario may not be politically
acceptable.   There has to be a balance in pricing of public utilities, as
they are meant for more utilisation by the public collectively.24 There are
also political economic constraints through the power of interest groups,
which have an interest in underpricing public sector products. Raj (1973)
analysed this from the perspective of intermediate regimes in the Indian
case.25
20
In the case of public utilities, the thrust areas should be reducing
operational inefficiencies (like transmission and distribution loss in power
distribution, keeping administrative and establishment costs within limits
and checking cost overruns.  It is very doubtful whether user charges
can be raised as a revenue gap bridging measure given the political
economic constraints. Concentration should be on the cost side, e.g. time
and cost overruns, so that reasonable user charges that become essential
can be levied. Since it is a levy, which can be precisely measured, the
opposition of the interest groups in measuring the consumption of utilities
can be stronger than in taxation, the evasion of which is comparatively
easier.
3. Trends in Expenditure of the Central Government
If we look at the share of total expenditure of the Central
Government and that of the Central and State Governments together in
the GDP, it can be seen that they have not risen abnormally. It has come
down in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s. The size of Government
measured by the total expenditure of the Centre and the States as a
Figure 6(a).  Central and Centre and States Total Expenditure as
Proportion of GDP
Source :  Computed from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
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proportion of GDP, over the period of three decades, has increased from
22 percent in 1970-71 to 32 percent in 1999-2000.26 Compared to the
OECD countries, this is relatively low. As far as the components of
expenditure are concerned, the share of revenue expenditure has been
rising throughout the period 1970-71 to 2002-03 and the gap between
the revenue and capital expenditure proportions is widening in the 1990s.
This is an indication of current expenditures growing at the expense of
productive investment.27
Figure 6 (b).  Revenue and Capital Expenditures as a Proportion of
Total Expenditure
Source: Computed from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
A look at the composition of revenue expenditure reveals that
interest is the major component of the revenue expenditure in the 1990s
[Table 7 (a)]. Contrary to popular perception it is not subsidies and wages
and salaries that have been rising, but interest payments. The proportion
of wages and salaries to the Government Final Consumption Expenditure
(GFCE) for the Centre, State and Local Bodies are given in Table 7. It
can be seen from table 7 (b) that wages and salaries as a proportion of
total expenditure of the Central Government has shown a 1 percent fall
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in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s, while showing a similar rise as a
proportion of revenue expenditure.
Table 7. Wages and Salaries as a Proportion of Government Final
Consumption Expenditure: 1970-71 to 1999-2000
Period Centre State Local Bodies
1970's 0.54 0.74 0.75
1980s 0.48 0.75 0.76
1990s 0.46 0.81 0.80
Source: Computed from National Accounts Statistics, EPW Research
Foundation
Table 7 (a). Proportion of Total Central Government Expenditure
to GDP and its broad composition
Period Total Central Revenue Capital
 Government Expenditure Expenditure
Expenditure as a proportion of  as a proportion
/GDP (%)  total Expenditure of total
(%) Expenditure (%)
11970s 16 (26) * 58 42
11980s 20 (32) 65 35
11990s 18 (31) 79 21
Note: * The figures in parentheses indicate the combined expenditure of
the Centre and the States as a proportion of GDP.
Source:Computed from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 7(b). Composition of Revenue Expenditure of the Central
      Government
Period Wages and Loans and
 Salaries Interest Defence  Subsidies
1970s 13 (22) 18 (11) 30 (17) 7 (4)
1980s 10 (16) 22 (14) 21(14) 14 (9)
1990s 11 (15) 35(27) 14 (11) 11 (9)
Note: (The figures in parentheses indicate the expenditures as a
proportion of Total Expenditure)
Source:Computed from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
Notwithstanding the impact of the Fifth Pay Commission, the share
of wages and Salaries in Government Final Consumption Expenditure has
come down for the Centre, whereas it has gone up for the States and the
Local bodies. This suggests that an increase in size of the States' bureaucracy
independent of the Pay Commission28  has accentuated the burden of wages
and salaries, while this has not happened in the case of the Centre.
The proportion of loans and subsidies to revenue expenditure has
also come down during the 1990s, though it is higher than it was during
the 1970s. This indicates that there is scope for directing and targeting
explicit and implicit subsidies.29 The export subsidies  have been
eliminated and fertiliser subsidy has come down. Targetting food subsidy
during the 1990s did not have the desired impact. Though issue prices
for customers Above Poverty Line (APL) from the Public Distribution
System (PDS) was raised, there was reduced off take from the PDS outlets
and resulting in a rise of  carrying cost subsidy of the Food Corporation
of India (FCI). There was more producer subsidy than customer subsidy
as there was increased procurement by the FCI at higher Minimum
24
Support Prices (See Report on Currency and Finance 2001-02, of Reserve
Bank of India for a discussion.) But whatever is done for targeting
subsidies, the major component needing attention is interest payments,
which has risen, due to change in method of financing fiscal deficit.
Increasing Interest Payments-Possible Reasons
With declining tax-GDP ratios and statistically insignificant tax
buoyancies, there has been more borrowing for meeting current
expenditures. The increase in interest payments as a proportion of revenue
expenditure, which has been quite marked since the 1990s is due to the
conscious shift in policy in financing deficits, i.e. instead of resorting to
monetisation of deficit by issue of ad hoc 91- day treasury bills at low
interest rates by the Reserve Bank of India, the deficit is financed by
market borrowings at higher rates of interest.30  While the fiscal deficit is
being increasingly financed by market borrowings at higher interest rates
than being financed by ad hoc treasury bills, the spending is for current
expenditure and not productive investment expenditure. At the same time
revenues have not been buoyant.
There have been suggestions for increased monetisation of deficit
[Naastepad (1999), Ramachandran et.al. (2001)]. But monetisation deficit
by increased RBI credit to the Government has an added dimension in
the present economic scenario with large foreign exchange reserves. Net
RBI credit to the Government and the Foreign Currency Reserves are
two main components of High Powered Money. A rise in these
components can lead to increase in money supply and inflationary
pressures. In the context of gradual opening up to foreign investments,
especially portfolio investments, foreign exchange reserves cannot be
said to be sufficient in terms of a specified period of import cover. The
holding of higher reserves is considered necessary for meeting exigencies
in the context of a more open external sector.31  With this component of
25
High Powered Money at a necessarily higher level compared to the pre-
reform period, the ability of the Government to monetise a higher
proportion of deficit is limited. Hence the higher interest burden by
resorting to increased market borrowing is a forced necessity as a
consequence for having to maintain a higher foreign exchange reserve.
To state in brief, the increasing proportion of revenue and total
expenditure being preempted by interest expenditure is the result of
conscious fiscal, monetary and external sector policies.32
 The growth of revenue expenditures and revenue receipts has shown
statistically significant increase during the three decades. The growth rate
of revenue expenditure and revenue receipts rose during the 1980s and
fell during the 1990s (Table 9 and Table 10). The fall in growth of revenue
receipts has occurred when the overall all growth rates showed a statistically
significant increase. Had revenue receipts increased during the 1990s, the
fiscal situation of the Centre would have been better. The impact of the fall
in growth of revenue receipts is reflected in the indicator, the fiscal self-
reliance, i.e. the ability to meet revenue expenditure out of revenue receipts.
This has come down from a position of surplus revenue receipts after
meeting revenue expenditure in the 1970s to a position of revenue receipts
not being able to meet revenue expenditure in the 1980s and the 1990s.
Table 8.  Fiscal Self Reliance of the Centre
Period Fiscal Self Reliance
1970s 1.05
1980s 0.85
1990s 0.74
Note: Fiscal self-reliance is measured as the ratio of revenue receipts
to revenue expenditure.
Source: Computed from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,
Reserve Bank of India
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Table 9. Growth Rate of Revenue Expenditure of the Centre:
Kinked Exponential Model: 1970-71 to 2002-03
Period Coefficient Std.Error t-value (t-Probability)
1970s 0.1451 0.002 48.49 (0.00)
1980s 0.1670 0.002 66.85 (0.00)
1990s to 2002-03 0.1289 0.002 54.39 (0.00)
R2= 0.999,  Adj R2 = 0.999, Root MSE = 0.037
Table 10. Growth Rate of Revenue Receipts of the Centre: Kinked
Exponential Model: 1970-71 to 2002-03
Period Coefficient Std.Error t-value(t-Probability)
1970s 0.1331 0.004 29.73 (0.00)
1980s 0.1459 0.003 39.01 (0.00)
1990s to 2002-03 0.1196 0.003 33.73 (0.00)
R2= 0.998,  Adj R2 = 0.998, Root MSE = 0.056
Problem Areas of Central Finances- A Summary
To summarise the major problem areas of Central finances for the
three decadal period are, on the revenue side
a) Decline in the trend growth of Tax Revenue and a stagnant trend
in Non-Tax Revenue
b) The non-buoyancy of direct as well as indirect taxes.
c) Political economic constraints setting limits to tax reforms aimed
at larger revenue mobilisation
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And on the expenditure side
a) Continuously increasing share of revenue expenditure in total
expenditure
b) Rising share of interest expenditure, in the 1990s which is the
result of a conscious policy decision to finance fiscal deficit by
market borrowings
c) Fall in share of developmental expenditure in the total expenditure
d) The changing composition in expenditure trends (of the Centre
and the States) can become unhelpful in influencing economic
growth in the future.
The prescription for this problem appears to be improving the tax
buoyancy and meeting an increased proportion of current expenditure
by revenue receipts rather than borrowing, which has become costlier
than before due to altered methods of financing fiscal deficits and change
in external sector policies. Any new proposal of revenue expenditure
should be accompanied by a proposal regarding revenue source for
meeting that.33
4.  Methods Employed for Achieving Fiscal balance
The traditional argument is that budget should be balanced and
expenditure should not exceed revenue.  If expenditure exceeds revenue,
budget is said to be unbalanced.  That budgets should be balanced was
often regarded, not only as an unquestioned percept of finance, but as a
moral percept as well. It is enunciated by orthodox financial experts
with a cold puritan pride (Dalton 1954).
Much emphasis has been laid on the proportion of fiscal deficit to
GDP/SDP as a summary measure of fiscal consolidation.34  Fiscal deficit
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as officially measured by the Government of India is the difference
between aggregate disbursements excluding debt repayments and
aggregate receipts net of debt receipts. The major defect of this indicator
is that fiscal deficit can be contained even while incurring more revenue
deficit, by having a surplus in the capital account. In other words,
spending for current expenditures through borrowings at the cost of
cutting down productive investment can also lead to a smaller fiscal
deficit. In fact, this has been happening through out the 1990s in India.
Let us now look at three methods employed to make the fiscal deficit as
a proportion of GDP lower.
Accounting Methods
There are definitional changes in fiscal deficit, which makes
comparison of the ratio fiscal deficit/GDP over the years difficult. For
example, borrowings from small savings by the States are not reflected
in the Centre's fiscal deficit since 1999-200035, which makes the official
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio not comparable with that of the previous years.
Utilising Disinvestment Proceeds
One method employed to show a reduced fiscal deficit is to treat
disinvestment proceeds as a revenue enhancing measure (Report on
Currency and Finance, 2001-02, Reserve Bank of India: IV-19). This
has been criticised by Dalton (1954), Mansoor (1993), Ize (1993),  Gulati
(1994) and Patnaik (2000). Dalton (1954) stated that when we consider
the budget, some expenditure and revenue would have to be excluded.
On the revenue side, the receipts which are in the nature of capital, such
as the proceeds of sales of public property, or sums drawn out of reserves
accumulated out of previous surpluses are to be excluded, for the
diminution of public capital assets is equivalent to an increase in the
deadweight public debt. Mansoor (1993) argued that government could
spread risk more readily than private agents and can be less risk averse.
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Under these circumstances, it may be expected that the governments
would have to sell assets at a discount relative to the expected value of
the stream of discounted earnings. The discount would have to be even
greater, if one considers other uncertainties- or example, future changes
in the regulation of prices, markets (including labour) and profits, possible
modifications of the tax regime, and the prospect of renationalisation at
below-market price. The above arguments suggest that even if the
governments were able to devise ways of selling assets at market value,
the prices would be below the expected discounted value of the stream
of earnings as perceived by the government. Mansoor (1993) argued,
"Even if all the proceeds of an asset sale were invested in financial assets,
the expected future income stream would be lower than without asset
sale. Put another way, the government would have to transfer some of its
wealth to the private sector to compensate for its greater risk aversion
and higher discount rate. Ize (1993) is of the view that accounting
consistency implies that a public disinvestment should be treated
symmetrically to a public investment. Revenues from the sale of public
assets should thus be counted as a flow ‘‘above the line”. From the
perspective of fiscal stance, a disinvestment unless it is offset by an
expansionary monetary policy- withdraws liquidity from the public.
Disinvestment would lower the overall investment in the economy,
because the private sector's demand for fixed capital is partially satisfied
through the purchase of existing capital rather than through new
investments. A policy through which the government finances its current
expenditure through the sale of fixed assets may thus end up having an
undesirable consequence on growth.  Gulati (1994) visualised an extreme
situation (stated as hypothetical) of government selling off equity in
public sector undertakings but not utilising it for new public investments.
In this case, the amounts raised by the government go to finance the
current expenditure and it should actually be treated as raising the fiscal
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deficit rather than reducing it. Patnaik (2000) opined that if the fiscal
deficit is considered undesirable as it crowds out private investment, the
same logic would apply to disinvetsment, if the private purchaser borrows
from the bank to purchase the equity of the public sector. The views
discussed above show that reducing fiscal deficit by including
disinvestment proceeds, as revenue cannot be treated as a desirable type
of fiscal consolidation.
Prescribing Legal Limits- Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act of Centre and the States
Emphasis on reducing fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP as the
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill of the Centre and
the States like Kerala36  and the Eleventh Finance Commission report
suggest, can result in Centre and States resorting to the soft option of
cutting capital investment expenditure rather than the downward sticky
revenue expenditure which is also championed by social and political
interest groups.37
The fiscal consolidation is sought to be achieved through legislative
measures like the FRBM Act, which sets limits for deficits to be adhered
to in a time bound manner. The Central Act gives some flexibility with
regard to achieving deficit targets. The deficit targetting approach of
Fiscal Responsibility legislation in countries like the U.S. has not been
successful. In fact tasks of revenue mobilisation and expenditure
monitoring is effectively possible in the existing framework at the
Governmental level with Parliamentary scrutiny. One has to wait and
watch to opine whether a legislation separately setting deficit targets is
going to make an additional contribution to improve fiscal situation.
It has to be noted that the FRBM Act 2003 not only targets fiscal
deficit, but also revenue deficit. In accordance with the rules to the FRBM
Act 2003, the Central Government has targetted to eliminate revenue
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deficit by 2008-09. Fiscal deficit is an indicator of the borrowings by the
government. The conventional argument is that higher borrowing by the
government crowds out the available funds for private investment and
also raises the interest rate thereby adversely affecting private investment.
A higher fiscal deficit is also expected to spill over to external sector.
This argument can be found in the report of the Eleventh Finance
Commission Report (Chapter III, para 3.7, p. 19), Report on Currency
and Finance 2001-02 and Srinivasan (2000). In the prevailing economic
situation, none of these is empirically tested in favour of the conventional
arguments.38
5.  The Alternative Path to Fiscal Consolidation
Contrary to the widely held perception, it is not ‘spiralling’
expenditure that has caused the fiscal problem at the Central level. In
fact the proportion of total expenditure to GDP (of the Centre alone and
Centre and States together) has declined in the 1990s when compared to
the 1980s.  But the revenue receipts of the Centre have not been buoyant
when tested for a thirty-year period. The tax-GDP ratios have also
declined during the 1990s when compared with the 1980s. This
necessitates contemplation for measures to achieve revenue buoyancy,
especially when the growth rate of the economic base of the taxes, i.e.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has shown statistically significant upward
shifts during the three decadal period starting from 1970-71. The fiscal
consolidation at the Central level is of paramount importance as the
consequential fiscal situation of the States’ and assistance through loans
and grants is critically dependent on the fiscal position of the Centre.
Fiscal consolidation should aim at collecting revenues from
emerging sectors of the economy, targeting expenditure towards
productive public and infrastructural investments, collect user charges
from the beneficiaries and undertake social sector expenditure for the
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benefit of development. It should not be a process of only deficit
targetting. In the present circumstances, the focus should be on increased
revenue mobilisation in an economy, which is having statistically
significant growth rate of the economic base of taxation, the Gross
Domestic Product.
It is difficult to predict whether the above suggestions as well as
the revenue led consolidation39  advocated by the Task force report on
the implementation of the FRBM Act 2003, would become a reality,
given the political economic constraints to tax reforms and expenditure
management. The challenge lies in the ability of the government to
strategically tackle these constraints with consensus among political
parties. This is essentially question of political strategy for tackling
economic problems. In other words, it is the art of balancing the fiscally
desirable with what is politically feasible.
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NOTES
1 The official view that causality runs from fiscal deficit to balance of
payments crisis has been questioned by Rakshit (1991) and Balakrishnan
(1997). Rakshit (1991) states that fiscal deficit does not represent the
saving investment gap in the government and finds no empirical
relationship between fiscal deficit and current account deficit.
2 We shall discuss later in this paper how this apparently hard budget
constraint was in fact a soft budget constraint and did not help in achieving
fiscal consolidation.
3 In the title of the paper we use the term ‘Procrustean’ Fiscal Correction.
Procrustes is a Greek mythological character. He was a high way
innkeeper who used to feed his guests with food and drinks. But when
they were made to sleep in a bed, if he found that they don’t exactly fit,
their limbs would be cut or stretched. Cutting deficits to meet a target
without regard to what expenditure is being cut can be termed as
Procrustean.
4 In the seminar in which this paper was presented, there were comments
that the period before and after liberalisation, say post and prior 1991or
post and prior mid-1980s cannot be compared for trends in receipts and
expenditure. While it can be agreed to that there has been substantial
internal and external sector reforms, the major sources of tax revenue of
the Central Government has not been altered. But there have been
considerable changes in the rate/duty structure, slabs, and share of revenue
contribution of the taxes. It is to be noted that the three decadal period
has witnessed gradual tax reforms. The 1980s saw a reduction of marginal
rates of taxation from the 1970s and during the 1990s there was still
further reduction of rates. The three decadal period also witnessed
immunity schemes, introduction of MODVAT, submission of reports by
tax reforms committees, administrative reforms in tax departments etc.
There were also two significant upward shifts in the growth rate of the
economic base of taxation, the Gross Domestic Product. To test the impact
of these changes on trend growth rate of major taxes, tax elasticity and
tax buoyancy, we have selected this time period of 1970-71 to 2002-03.
5 Non-debt creating capital receipts are recoveries of loans and
disinvestment proceeds, whereas debt creating capital receipts are market
borrowings, small savings and PF receipts.
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6 The Report on Currency and Finance, 2001-02 of the Reserve Bank of
India, states that the Non-tax revenue of the Central Government recorded
an improvement from 2.1 percent in 1990-91 to 3.0 percent in 2001-02.
An examination of the trend in Non-Tax revenues reveals that increase
in dividend and profits and economic services fully account for the
improvement in Centre’s collection of Non-Tax revenue, as growth in
other components remained stagnant during the reform period, according
to the report. Much of the improvement in dividends and profits came
from the profits of the Reserve Bank of India, which increased from
Rs.210 crore in 1990-91 to Rs.10320 crore in 2001-02, there by raising
its share from 1.8 percent to 15.2 percent of the Non-Tax revenue. The
rise in profits is mainly due to earnings from deployment of foreign
currency assets, conversion of 4.6 percent Treasury bills into marketable
securities and discontinuation of the practice of crediting large sums to
the National Industrial (LTO) fund. This makes it clear that but for the
increased remitting of profits of the Reserve Bank of India to the Centre,
the trend of Non-Tax Revenues would have shown a downward trend.
7 A more precise tax base would be Gross domestic Product minus the
subsistence income, though many studies take the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as the tax base.
8 This idea of sharing information finds a mention in the report of the
Task force on the implementation of the FRBM Act, 2003.
9 When two variables are non-stationary, but integrated of the same order,
for example I (1), and if the residuals are stationary at levels, I (0), then
the variables can be combined in a co integrating relationship.
10 I am grateful to the anonymous referee for reminding me of this aspect.
11 See also Mundle and Mukhopadyaay (1993) for a discussion.
12 The residual properties indicate that the model is adequate. The statistic
is given along with the probability in parenthesis. The null hypotheses
are there is no autoregression, there is no Autoregressive Conditional
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH), there is normality, there is no hetroscedasticity
and the model is not misspecified  (RESET). A low value of the statistic
and the high value of the probabilities indicate that the null hypotheses
fail to reject.
13 Agricultural GDP is excluded from the base for measuring elasticity, as
agricultural income is exempt from Central income tax.
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14 The Augmented Dickey Fuller Test was used for testing unit roots. There
is a problem with this test as one of the variables, i.e. logarithmic
transformation of Personal Income Tax has two structural breaks, but
the logarithmic transformation of non-agricultural GDP has no structural
break at 1 percent level, when tested using the Chow’s test for structural
break. An alternative method to test for unit roots when structural breaks
are present is Perron’s test. We are not attempting this here. The Report
on Currency and Finance, 2001-02, Reserve Bank of India :IV-10 has
shown a statistically significant relationship between personal income
tax and GDP. But the variables are not taken in their log transformations,
i.e. not in the double log model, usually used for obtaining co-efficients
of elasticity. When tested for model adequacy, we find that the residual
properties were not satisfied, rendering the coefficients obtained using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) unreliable.
15 Growth rates are logarithmic first differences.
16 It is to be noted that our result of non-buoyancy of taxes is different
from those in Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank  of India 2001 and
the Report of the Task Force on Implementation of  the FRBM Act,
2003, which find significant tax elasticity to GDP. We find that those
regressions involving time series variables do not satisfy the residual
properties and hence the OLS estimators are not reliable.
17 The narrowing of the legal base as compared to the economic base is
obviously due to political economic reasons, mainly the influence of
various classes and groups in the society over the state.
18 Das Gupta and Mookherjee (1997: 166) have pointed out that the extent
of tax evasion seems to be concentrated in the (annual) income range of
Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs.4.5 lakhs. The extent of evasion in this range is as high
as 90 to 95 percent. The evasion estimate falls sharply to about 30 to 40
percent in incomes above Rs. 5 lakhs on the upper end and to between
70 and 80 percent for those between Rs. 30000 and one lakh. With the
lowering of marginal rates and thus decreasing progressivity in the tax
rates since the second half of the 1990s, the main collection point is on
the middle-income groups. It is perhaps this missing middle, a large
proportion of them earning income in the service sector, that is accounting
for the statistically insignificant coefficient of the buoyancy of Personal
Income tax with its base, the non-agricultural GDP.
19 It is yet another matter that indirect taxation still plays a very important
role in a federal set up like ours and its reforms deserve serious
consideration, for example Service tax and VAT.
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20 see Harris White (2003) for a discussion
21 For a brief discussion on the implementation problems of the
recommendations of GST, see Venkitaramanan (2004)
22 For a discussion on this with regard to Rajasthan, see Jenkins (1999).
23 For a study of the plight of the power sector in India, which is a typical
public utility supplied by the Union and the State Governments, see
Kannan and Pillai (2001) and Report on Currency and Finance,
2001-02, Reserve Bank of India.
24 Wicksell (1896) states a s a general rule that if a public enterprise is
already in existence and thus a potential loss of original investment costs
must be faced in any case, then the (theoretically) most economic method
of covering costs will always be Price = Marginal Cost, that is additional
costs occasioned by the last unit of service, leaving the general costs to
be financed by taxes. If this cannot be economically done, that is no
conceivable way of distributing the required total tax can command
approximate unanimity, then the whole enterprise must be considered
uneconomic and best be discontinued. Any loss of money or interest
payments thereon might be shared according to the principle of equal
(or proportionate) sacrifice. This in effect amounts to say that public
borrowings to cover the total costs of enterprises is economically
unfeasible and Government can consider discontinuing such enterprises
by transferring them to cooperatives or private sector. This should be
done for public enterprises producing purely private goods and making
losses. It is a desirable sign that budgetary support to public enterprises
has come down from 39.7 percent in the Seventh Plan period to 12.7 in
the Eighth Plan period to 11.9 percent in 1998-99, of the resources of
the public sector. But disinvestment has been attempted in the case of
profit making public sector enterprises like the oil companies, which
earn resource rents.
25 It needs to be mentioned here that the analysis of the Indian state as one
dominated by an alliance of lower middle class and rich peasantry was
criticised by Namboothiripad (1973). In his view, the Indian state was
one dominated by big bourgeoisie and feudal landlords with lower middle
classes and rich peasantry being their camp followers. An analysis of
the intermediate regimes in the context of liberalisation has been made
by Bardhan (1993). Intermediate regimes affecting state policies has
also  been discussed by Harris White (2003).
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26 The size effect of government on economic growth may not be adequately
captured by the total expenditure of the government as the size may not
capture the difference between the regulatory role and the direct
intervention. For a discussion, see Slemrod (1995).
27 However one needs to be careful in generalising this. Maintenance of
capital assets falls in the category of revenue expenditure. Social sector
spending falls in the category of revenue expenditure. As pointed out
earlier, all capital expenditure need not be productive and all revenue
expenditure unproductive. The increasing proportion of revenue
expenditures, when the trend growth rate of revenue receipts is stagnating
implies that there is borrowing for revenue expenditure and a rising
revenue deficit and interest burden on debt.
28 Though we do not intend to state that the impact of pay revision
consequent to the higher pay granted equivalent to the scales suggested
by the Fifth pay Commission for the Centre has not adversely affected
the State finances, it is sought to be emphasised that the adverse effect
on State finances is due to the combined effect of the increasing trend in
wages in salaries for the period 1970-71 to 1999-2000 and the rise in
pay consequent to Fifth pay Commission.
29 The tax breaks for export income in the Income tax Act, 1961, (Section
80 HHC) are being phased out to be eliminated by 1’st April 2005.
30 It is not proposed here that higher borrowing has led to higher rates of
interest. In fact, there are arguments against this hypothesis. For a
discussion, see Patnaik (2000). The higher interest payments are due to
shift in policy from low cost borrowing through treasury bills to high
cost market borrowings, where interest rates are already high.  To state
in other words, we do not attribute a casuative relation or an association
between higher government borrowing and rise in interest rates. This is
however a testable proposition.  The inability to generate resources to
meet expenditure obligations is the major cause for borrowing.
31 Though we are not having full convertibility on capital account, there is
gradual opening up of the external sector.
32 It should also be taken note of that since the latter half of the 1990s there
has been softening of interest rates and comfortable foreign exchange
position has enabled the Government to repay previously incurred high
cost debt.
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33 This was a proposal from Knut Wicksell in 1896.  For a discussion, see
Mueller (2003: 382)
34 The fact that the acceptability of this measure has been challenged
deserves mention. Illustrative examples in the literature on this subject
are Gulati (1994), Rao and Amarnath (2000), Srinivasan (2000, p.48).
Even the Union Finance Minister’s Budget Speech, 2003 has to a certain
extent recognised this, by stating that revenue deficit is the main worry
and not the fiscal deficit. Rakshit (1991) and Balakrishnan (1997) have
examined the relationship between fiscal deficit and macro economic
variables and found practically no relationship. Balakrishnan (1997)
points out that fiscal deficit as a macroeconomic tool has weaknesses.
35 The Centre includes the portion of small savings borrowed by the States
in a special fund. National Small Savings Securities Fund (NSSF) and
treats the balance as its capital receipts. The interest due on small savings
is however included in the expenditure.
36 Though the Central Act has not prescribed a target for the proportion of
fiscal deficit to GDP on a yearly basis and leaves it to the Central
Government, the Kerala Act has prescribed a target of 2 percent fiscal
deficit to GDP ratio. Since it has been legislated, the achievement of
targets becomes an obligation and indiscriminate cutting of expenditure
including productive capital expenditure may happen.
37 Here we should take note of the fact that revenue deficit reduction and
raising capital expenditure proportion have also been suggested by the
EFC.
38 We are not entering into elaborate economic counter arguments to these
propositions, which of course have been made by Rakshit (1991), Patnaik
(2000), Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002), Fazzari (1994), Naastepad
(1999) etc.
39 It is worth mentioning here that the Task force on the implementation of
the FRBM Act 2003 discusses the arguments in favour of fiscal
consolidation through revenue mobilisation than through expenditure
reduction. The reasons mentioned in the report are 1) positive impact on
State finances 2) raising taxes is less contractionary than cutting
expenditure for the macroeconomy and 3) tax reforms spur GDP growth
by removing the existing misallocation of resources.
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